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I. 
NATURE OF TIIE CASE 
Petition by Intervenors Frank Tuckey and Mary Tuckey 
to gain custody of their grandchildren Larry Dean Tuckey, 
Jr., and Christopher Lee Tuckey. 
II. 
DI SP OS ITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Petition denied on April 24, 1980. Motion for new 
trial or in the alternative to open judgment and take additional 
testimony denied on June 4, 1980. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
A reversal of the lower court's decision and entry of 
an order of the Supreme Court granting custody of the minor 
children to Intervenors. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The underlying action is one for divorce brought by 
Plaintiff Larry Dean Tuckey against Debra A. Tuckey. Plaintiff 
and Defendant were and are parents of two (2) children, to wit, 
Larry Dean Tuckey, Jr., a male, born March 22, 1975 and Christopher 
Lee Tuckey, a make, born July 30, 1976. Permanent care, custody 
and control of the said minor children was vested in Defendant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Debra A. Tuckey under the terms of the original Decree of Divorce. 
The petition of Frank Tuckey and Mary Tuckey to intervene in 
this matter was granted on the 15th day of February, ·1979, as 
was Intervenors' Motion for Temporary custody of the minor children 
pending a final resolution of the issue of permanent custody. 
In connection with the granting of the two motions as set forth 
above, the Court ordered that a family evaluation be conducted 
prior to the consideration of permanent custody by the Court. 
An evaluation of Intervenors was performed on August 30, 1979 
by Denise Taft pursuant to the Court's order, wherein it was 
recommended that the minor children remain under the permanent 
care, custody and control of Intervenors. Ms. Taft was unable 
to locate the natural mother, Debra A. Tuckey, to perform any 
evaluation of her at that time. The trial, originally set for 
January 28, 1980, was continued at the behest of Defendant until 
February 29, 1980. During the approximately one year period from 
February of 1979 through February of 1980, the minor children 
resided with Intervenors while Defendant lived in various places, 
including Randolf, Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah and La Pointe, 
Utah. During the year the minor children lived with their grand-
parents they had limited contact with their natural mother by 
telephone and by personal contact. During the time the minor 
children stayed with Intervenors, they were well taken care of, 
received a great deal of love as well as discipline and enjoyed 
the structured environment. Intervenors made substantial economic 
-2-
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outlays for the benefit of the minor children and spent a great 
deal of time with the children in family-related activities. 
Intervenors received no support or help of any kind from either 
the father of the minor children or the mother, Defendant Debra 
A. Tuckey, although Intervenors did receive a small amount of 
help from the State of Utah. 
Just prior to the trial in this matter, on February 26, 
1980, Ms. Taft of the Department of Social Services did a 
followup evaluation of Intervenors as well as an evaluation of 
Defendant Debra A. Tuckey as this Court had previously ordered. 
Ms. Taft reiterated in the report on this second evaluation what 
she had provided in the earlier one, to wit: that the interests 
of the minor children would be best served by allowing them 
to remain under the permanent care, custody and control of Inter-
venors. 
There was some confusion prior to the trial on the merits 
of this matter as to the actual standard to be applied by the Court 
to the facts. Counsel for Intervenors argued that the "best interests 
of the minor children" should be the controlling factor whereas 
counsel for Defendant Debra A. Tuckey argued that to prevail, 
Intervenors would be required to prove Defendant unfit. After a 
trial on the merits, the Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
presiding, denied Intervenors' petition and by order dated April 
24, 1980 awarded full care, custody and control of the minor 
-3-
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children of the parties to Defendant Debra A. Tuckey, the children's 
natural mother. 
v. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Utilized An Incorrect Standard in 
Deciding This Matter and Must Therefore, be Reversed. 
The approach taken by various courts to the issue of con-
tested custody between a natural parent and a grandparent may be 
divided into two specific categories, i.e., the "parental right" 
doctrine and the "best interests of the child". The former re-
quires a showing on the part of the moving party that the natural 
parent is unfit or that other extraordinary circumstances exist 
which overcome the presumption that a natural parent is entitled 
to custody over the grandparent. In the latter case the child's 
welfare and best interests are presumed to be more important than 
any parental right. See, generally, 29 ALR 3d 366, 390-395. It 
is Intervenors' contention that the Court here should have applied 
the "best interests" doctrine in accordance with Utah law and 
most jurisdictions and by failing so to do connnitted reversible 
error. 
A general survey of cases on this particular point reveals 
that the modern tendency is toward the "best interests" of the child 
and away from the "parental right" approach. As between parents 
-4-
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d 
vying for custody of a child, there can be little argument that 
the "best interest" of the child is the appropriate standard 
in most, if not all jurisdictions. The apparent jusiification 
for arguing that a different standard should apply when a non-
parent is seeking custody from a natural parent stems of course 
from a "natural law" theory that there is some innate right on 
the part of the natural parent to the society of the child during 
the child's minority. However, the following survey will reflect 
that the courts are quite consistent in applying the "best interests" 
approach in cases of this kind: 
a. Florida. In the the case of Brandon v. Faulk, 326 
So.2d 76 (Fla., 1976), the Court upheld the trial Court's decision 
to vest custody of a nine year old girl in the paternal grand-
parents and in so doing stated at 80: 
. in such [custody] situations the best 
interest of the minor child is of paramount 
consideration and is the guiding pole star. 
b. Nebraska. Another state which has recently rejected 
the application of the "parental right" doctrine is the State 
of Nebraska. In the case of State v. Blanco, 128 NW2d 615 
(Neb., 1964) the Court stated at 619: 
The courts may not properly deprive a parent 
of the custody of a minor child unless it is 
affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit 
to perform the duties imposed by the relation-
ship, or has forefeited that right. 
-5-
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In the Blanco case the Court overturned the lower 
decision granting custody of the child to the natural mother, 
and gave custody of the child to the grandmother under the theory 
that the natural mother was not fit and proper and that therefore 
she had forefeited her right to custody of the child. In any 
event, this approach was not utilized in the later cases of 
Contreras v. Alsidez, 265 NW2d 452 (Neb., 1978) wherein the 
Court recognized the "best interest" test as superior to the 
rights of any parties, including the natural parents, although 
the latter were, of course, to be considered. 
c. Hinnesota. In the case of Hemman v. Markson, 244 
NW 687 (Minn., 1932) although the court sustained a change of 
custody of a twelve year old boy from the maternal grandparents 
to the mother, the Court recognized the best interest standard 
at 687: 
The superior right of a parent to the custody 
of a child is recognized by the law; but this 
right yields to the best interests of the 
child. 
That standard was followed in the later case of Wallin v. 
Wallin, 187 NW2d 687 (Minn., 1971) wherein the Court, on an 
inconclusive evidentiary record, remanded a case wherein a 
natural mother's petition to wrest custody of a six year old 
girl from the maternal grandparents was denied by the trial court. 
This action was explained at 630 as follows: 
The principle that the custody of young chilren 
is ordinarily best vested in the mother, vital 
-6-
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and established as it may be, is distinctly 
subordinate to the controlling principle 
that the overriding consideration in custody 
proceedings is the child's welfare. 
d. Oklahoma. In ex parte Walla cs, 241 P. 2d 192 (Okla., 
1952) the maternal grandmother sought custody of a thirteen year 
old girl. At trial, neither the grandmother nor the natural 
mother was shovm to be unfit. The Court indicated its obligation 
to be to review the whole record and determine which custody 
was in the best interest of the minor child under all the 
facts and circumstances shown, and indicated at 193 as follows: 
She [the natural mother] has not by abandonment 
or by any improper conduct on her part or by 
contract surrendered the right to its control 
and custody to petitioner. In these circumstances 
the law •vill presur.ie that she is a fit and proper 
person to have its care and custody and that the 
best interest of the child require that custody 
be awarded her and this presumption will prevail 
until overcome by clear and convincing evidence 
showing that its best interest requires that 
custody be placed elsewhere. 
e. Pennsylvania. In the relative early case of In Re 
Beaver's Estate, 182 A. 744 (Penn., 1936) a six year old girl who 
had lived for a time with her paternal grandparents was returned 
to the custody of her mother. The Court agreed at 745 with the 
trial court's opinion: 
... that the proper criteria in a case of 
this nature is the best interest and permanent 
wellbeing of the child. 
-7-
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In Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz, 281 A.2d 729 (Penn., 1971) 
the Court overturned a lower court's decision taking custody of 
boys aged ten and eleven from the maternal grandparents and 
giving them to the natural mother. The Court at 730 specifically 
did not utilize the "parental right" approach and did not dwell 
upon the alleged -unfitness of the natural mother, who was 
unconventional in lifestyle and morality, but at 730 recognized 
the following standard: 
Unless compelling reasons appear, it will be 
deemed that the best interests of children 
of tender years require that they be connnitted 
to the care and custody of their mother. 
Thus, although the Court did require a showing of compelling 
reasons, the primary standard of the best interests of the children 
was recognized over the presumption in favor of the natural parent. 
f. Texas. In the case of In Re Benfield, 46 8 SW2d 156 
(Tex., 1971) the Court recognized "best interests" as the standard 
in an adoption proceeding and followed this standard in the case 
of Interest of Barrera, 531 SW2d 908 (I'..:x., 1975) In the Barrera 
case, upon the death of the father, the maternal grandparents were 
named by the trial court as managing conservators under Texas 
law of two minor children, ages nine and seven, and the natural 
mother was named only temporary possessory conservator. The mother 
appealed this decision, which was affirmed on appeal. The Court 
in this regard at 910 stated: 
-8-
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Although there is a presumption that a 
surviving parent is the most suitable person 
to have custody of minor children, the con-
trolling consideration is the best interests 
of the children . . . Since the welfare of 
children is the court's paramount concern 
and guiding consideration in any contest 
over the right to custody, this concern 
and consideration will prevail over any 
asserted claim of legal right in a party to 
the controversy. 
It is also important to note that in the Barrera case, the 
trial court had even disregarded a Texas statute giving the 
surviving natural parent entitlement to appointment of guardian 
of the child's estate. 
The foregoing are representative of holdings in the follow-
ing jurisdictions and cases: Graves v. Graves, 288 So2d 142 
(Ala., 1973); Wallace v. Moss, 174 SE2d 197, (Georgia, 1970); 
Osman v. Osman, 264 NE2d 263 (Ill., 1970); Perdue v. Perdue, 
257 NE2d 927 (Indiana, 1970); Wood v. Beard, 280 So.2d 567 
(La., 1973); Elm v. Key, 489 P.2d 104 (Wyo., 1971); Carrere v. 
Prunty, 133 NW2d 692 (Iowa, 1954). 
At least two cases directly bearing on the issue before this 
Court have been decided in the jurisdiction of Utah. In the 
case of Walton v. Coffman, 169 P.2d 97 (1946), the natural 
mother by a writ of habeas corpus sought to recover custody of 
two minor children from the maternal grandparents. The Court 
at 100 observed as follows: 
-9-
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All of our decisions recognize the general 
rule that the welfare of the child is 
controlling. 
The Court then engaged in a rather detailed resume of previous 
cases that had brought this issue before the Court including 
Harrison v. Harker, 142 P. 716; Jones v. Moore, 213 P. 191; 
Jensen v. Earley, 228 P. 217; and Sherry v. Doyle, 249 P.250, 
from which the Court at 102 to 103 distilled the following rule: 
We conclude that the determining consideration 
in cases of this kind is: What will be for the 
best interest and welfare of the child? That 
in determining this question there is a pre-
sumption that it will be for the best interest 
and welfare of the child to be reared under 
the care, custody and control of the natural 
parent; that this presumption is not over-
come unless from all of the evidence the 
trier of the facts is satisfied that the wel-
fare of the child requires that it be awarded 
to someone other than its natural parent. 
Thus, the ultimate burden of proof on this 
question is always in favor of the parent 
and against the other person. 
However, this presumption is one of fact 
and not of law, and may be overcome by any 
competent evidence which is sufficient to 
satisfy a reasonable mind thereon. 
We are satisfied that this is the rule which 
has been followed in this Court in all our 
cases except Jensen v. Earley, supra. To the 
extent that Jensen v. Earley holds to the con-
trary it is expressly overruled. This rule 
is sustained by the great weight of authority 
in this country and we think by the better 
reasoning. 
-10-
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The Court in the subsequent case of Hardcastle v. Hardcastle, 
221 P.2d 883 (Utah, 1950) recognized the rule as set forth in 
the Coffman case as the applicable rule, but at 887 found that 
it was not applicable under the facts of the Hardcastle case. 
In accord with Coffman are the following: Farmer v. 
Christensen, 183 P.328 (Utah, 1919); 209 P.340 (Utah, 1922); 
Wallick v. Vance, 289 P.103 (Utah, 1930); and Flora v. Flora 
29 P.2d 498 (Utah, 1934). 
Thus, the law of the State of Utah as well as the law 
of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions of the United States, 
is that the best interest and welfare of a minor child will be 
the controlling factor in determining custody between a natural 
parent and a grandparent, and although there may be a pre-
sumption in favor of the natural parent and this presumption has 
been recognized in virtually all of the literature cited above, 
that presumption, at least in the State of Utah, is a presumption 
of fact which may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence 
to the contrary. Nowhere in Utah decisions cited above or in 
any of the authorities that have been cited by Intervenors in 
support of this petition, is there found a standard which re-
quires that Intervenors prove the natural mother unfit. To 
do so requires that Intervenors overcome a virtually insurmountable 
burden and to impose such a.burden on lntervenors is under the 
great weight of authority incorrect and must constitute reversible 
error. 
-11- ' I 
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2. Certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Entered by the Court are not Supported by the Evidence. 
a. Finding of Fact No. 6. (R, 94) After a hearing on 
objections of Intervenors to the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel for Defendant Debra 
A. Tuckey, counsel for Intervenors submitted Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. As to Finding of Fact No. 6, the Court 
crossed out the following proposed Finding of Fact in its 
entirety: 
A home study was performed by Denise Taft, 
a social service worker, prior to August 
30, 1979 wherein Ms. Taft recorra:nended that 
permanent. custody of the two (2) minor 
children be vested in Intervenors. 
In place of the foregoing Finding of Fact the Court 
substituted "Plaintiff is not seeking custody of the children 
at this time" and added, apparently referring to the second 
portion, the following: 
The Court makes no finding thereon, as there 
was no evaluation made of Defendant Debra 
A. Tuckey. 
In the first place, Ms. Taft testified under oath that 
she was assigned by the Department of Family Services to perform 
a home study on Intervenors on approximately August l, 1979 
(R, 168, line 24 - R, 169, line 8) and further testified that 
although reasonable efforts were made to find Debra A. Tuckey, 
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she was not able to do so and therefore Ms. Taft did not 
evaluate Defendant Debra A. Tuckey at that time. (R, 169, 
line 10-17) In any event, the home study was finally 
accomplished, and the difference between how the children acted 
on August 1, 1979 and in February, 1980 when the home study 
and evaluation of Debra A. Tuckey was performed was remarkable 
to Ms. Taft. (R, 172, lines 1-13) She stated (R, 172, 
lines 10-13) : 
They seemed not threatened and much more 
relaxed and more secure in this interaction 
than they had been the previous one. 
The point of the matter is that Ms. Taft recommended as 
a result of the home study performed in August, 1979 that the 
children be allowed to remain with their grandparents, and 
the followup study that was done wherein Ms. Taft was able to· 
observe Defendant Debra A. Tuckey did not change that opinion. 
If anything, the previous contact in August of 1980 should have 
made Ms. Taft's testimony more valid and should have been given 
more weight by the Court inasmuch as Ms. Taft had more of an 
opportunity to observe the grandparents and the children with 
the grandparents than she otherwise would have had. Furthermore, 
the study performed in February of 1980 was nothing more than 
an extension of the study previously commenced in August of 1979, 
-13-
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and the Court should not have arbitrarily disregarded those 
conclusions reached in August of 1979 for the mere reason that 
the natural mother was not part of the evaluation. Whether or 
not the mother was a party to the investigation has nothing to 
do with the observations that Ms. Taft made in the grandparents' 
home and it is erroneous not to have considered the same. 
b. Finding of Fact No. 7. (R, 94) The Court crossed out of 
proposed Finding of Fact No. 7 the following: 
Wherein it was further recoilllllended that 
Defendant not have permanent custody of 
them. 
In fact, the followup visit in February of 1980 did bear 
the recommendation that Defendant, the natural mother of the 
children, not have permanent custody of the children. (R, 179, 
lines 14-19). The point seems important and it appears that 
the Court in this instance had moved from its position as a 
dispassionate forum and has apparently specifically disregarded 
certain evidence because it does not comport with its ovm 
predilections as to where children should be placed in custody 
battles. While it is within the Court's discretion to give or 
not give certain weight or credibility to expert testimony, 
nevertheless it cannot be within the Court's power to completely 
disregard as a finding of fact a conclusion reached by an 
employee of the Department of Social Services who became 
-14-
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involved in the matter in the first place at the Court's own 
order. 
c. Finding of Fact No. 9. (R, 94) The Court added to 
the proposed Finding of Fact that: 
[t]he job market in Vernal appears to be 
very good. 
Debra A. Tuckey testified that her husband would "probably" 
get a job Monday, (R, 125, line 20) but that it was not promised. 
(R, 125, line 22) A search of ta transcript has revealed no 
other testimony relative to the job market in Vernal and 
therefore there is no basis for the finding of fact as indicated 
by the Court. Further, Defendant Debra A. Tuckey (R, 126, line 
11) testified that she was buying land from her mother, but made 
no further indications in this regard can be found, indicating 
no basis for such finding. 
d. Conclusion of Law No. 2. (R, 95) By this interliniation 
the Court has muddied the water as to the actual standard applied. 
At the hearing of Intervenors' objections to the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and other motions before the Court, 
counsel for Intervenors sought a clarification of the standard 
utilized by the Court at trial: (R, 244, lines 1-11) 
MR. GUYON: As long as it's clear that the Court 
actually used the standard that I had 
a burden to show that the mother was 
·unfit. But that doesn't seem clear to 
me, your honor. 
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THE COURT: 
MR. GUYON: 
THE COURT: 
It's less than clear from the cases, 
but I thing that's what the cases are 
saying. 
I would also argue, your Honor, that 
the actual standard the Court is bound 
to utilize is that of the best interests 
of the children. 
As to that, I would clearly reject that. 
I don't think that's consistent with 
Utah law. 
Thus, while the Court admitted in that hearing that it had 
actually utilized the standard of requiring Intervenors to show 
the mother unfit in order to prevail, the conclusion of law 
as indicated by the Court reflects a different standard. 
3. The Clear Weight of Evidence in this Matter Supports 
Intervenors' Position. 
It is submitted that the testimony on record taken as 
a whole, and the record itself, empower and even require this 
Court, upon application of the correct standard, to find that 
Intervenors should receive custody of the minor children of 
the initial parties to this action. 
In the first place, Defendant Debra A. Tuckey voluntarily 
relinquished custody and control of the children to Intervenors. 
The minute entry made on February 8, 1979 (R, 37) indicates 
"No objection from the mother, Debra Tuckey." As indicated in 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the subsequent order (R, 38) the Court heard Debra A. Tuckey's 
sworn testimony relative to the issue of temporary custody 
and granted the same to Intervenors. In that same order (R, 39) 
the Court ordered a custody evaluation, the result of which 
Judge Rigtrup refused to make finding of fact (R, 94) as discussed 
above. It is true that Debra A. Tuckey moved the Court to set 
aside the order (R, 42), but when that motion was denied (R, 49, 
50) it is significant to note that Defendant did not have sufficient 
interest to renotice the matter before the Honorable Dean Conder 
as provided for in the order (R, 49). 
The year following the February, 1979 hearing was indicative 
of Defendant's lack of interest in her children as well as the 
circumstances of their being with Intervenors: Avis (the maternal 
grandmother) had the children and allowed Intervenors to take 
them (R, 136, lines 2-4, testimony of Intervenor Mary Tuckey). 
No support, including money, clothing and toys, was 
ever given to Intervenors by Defendant or members of Defendant's 
family even though promises were made both by Defendant and 
Defendant's mother. (R, 136, lines 12-20, testimony of Intervenor 
Mary Tuckey). 
Contacts between the mother and the children were very 
sparse, short telephone contacts having occurred on February 7th 
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and 26th, 1979 (R, 148, lines 12, 13); March 4, 11, 22 and 26, 
1979 (R, 148, lines 21; 22); April 8, 17, 27, 1979 (R, 148, 
lines 1-3); and July 3, 1979 (R, 148, line 4). Between July 
3, 1979 and January 7, 1980 there was absolutely no telephone 
contact between Defendant and her children (R, 149, line 5-9). 
All the telephone contacts were short and Mary Tuckey testified 
(R, 148, lines 15, 16) she would ask Defendant if Defendant 
wanted to talk with her own children and in several cases 
Defendant had not communicated wibh the boys during the telephone 
contacts. Defendant testified she lived in La Pointe, Utah 
during this period (R, 195, lines 1-2) and that she had access 
to her mother's phone (R, 199, lines 9-10). Defendant's 
testimony relative to the availability of a telephone is unclear 
in view of her earlier statement (R, 196, lines 12-16) that 
she had to travel miles to a pay telephone. 
Relative to personal contacts, Mary Tuckey testified to 
several such contacts between Debra and the children during the 
year starting in February, 1979 (R, 149, line 12 to R, 153, 
line 1). Debra excused the infrequency of such contacts because 
of lack of transportation (R, 195, line 17-21), but admitted 
on cross-examination (R, 207, lines 1-11) that she came to 
Salt Lake City "often" and "twice" without seeing the children. 
Mary Tuckey's testimony (R, 155, line 10-18) that Defendant 
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told her Defendant's mother wanted the children so they could 
receive further welfare benefits was totally unrefuted by other 
testimony. 
Other unrefuted testimony of Mary Tuckey bears serious 
consideration by this Court. She described the children's un-
ruly behavior when first entering her home (R, 136, lines 3-6), 
but indicates. also a close relationship with them (R, 136, 
line 8). Furthermore, the children received excellent care in 
the form of clothing and medical health (R, 136, lines 10-11); 
clothing (R, 136, line 10); and entertainment (R, 141, lines 
9-23). Intervenors even cashed in a life insurance policy 
to pay back bills and buy the children a bed. (R, 142, lines 
2-8). 
The testimony of Denise Taft, who was stipulated to as 
to expert testimony (R, 168, line 14), was very much in favor 
of Intervenors as custodians. Ms. Taft met with Intervenors 
in their home as well as in her office (R, 169, lines 4-8) and 
made the following observations and came to the following 
conclusions in their regard: 
They were providing appropriate structuring, 
disciplining and parenting models. (R, 178, 
line 17 to R, 179, line 3) 
The children should remain in their home. 
(R, 197, lines 15-19). 
Ms. Taft would not retreat from this position even when pressed 
by the Court. (R, 180, lines 7-9). 
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On the other hand, Ms. Taft's testimony relative to 
Debra A. Tuckey was that Debra was more a friend or peer than 
a parent (R, 177, lines 3-5) and that there was concern about 
direction, consistency (R, 177, lines 11-15); ability to 
discipline (R, 178, lines 1-14) and maturity (R, 186, lines 
10-17 and R, 189, lines 13-20). Furthermore, inappropriate 
aggressive behavior by the children occurred only in the presence 
of their mother. (R, 187, lines 8-25). There was also concern 
for Defendant's ability to acquire parenting skills through 
a social services program as suggested by Defendant's counsel 
(R, 189, lines 8-20) and Ms. Taft unequivocally stated that 
Defendant did not have appropriate parenting skills (R, 190, 
lines 5-7). 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, it has been shown above that the trial court abused 
its discretion in utilizing the wrong standard applicable to 
this case. Clearly, the weight of authority is in favor of the 
"best interest of the child" approach as opposed to the "parental 
right" doctrine. The Utah cases cited herein are in accord with 
that word of authority, and the trial court was bound to apply 
that standard. 
It is also clear that the trial court made Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law that were inconsistent with the testimony 
and other parts of the record, and requires that the trial court's 
decision be reversed. 
Finally, it is Intervenors' contention that upon the 
weight of the evidence in the record, coupled with the application 
of the correct standard, Intervenors are entitled to an order 
of the Court granting permanent care, custody and control of 
the minor children of Plaintiff and Defendant to them. 
DATED this J 0 day of December, 1980. 
ROBINSON, GUYON, Sill1MERHAYS & BARNES 
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